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we then estimate the probability that each state’s
reserve balances will be sufficient to offset the fiscal
stress from a recession. In other words, we estimate
the probability that each state in the Eighth Federal
Reserve District will be able to avoid spending
reductions or tax increases if a recession were to
begin in 2007.
In the following sections of the paper, we
review previous research, outline our empirical
methodology and findings, and offer concluding
remarks.
STATE FISCAL CRISES AND
“OPTIMAL” RAINY DAY FUNDS
An Overview of State Fiscal Crises and
Policy Options
Although many factors contribute to periods
of state fiscal pressure, the cyclical variability of
revenue streams is generally considered to be the
E
conomic downturns often force state
policymakers into difficult financial posi-
tions because of the procyclical nature
of tax bases and the countercyclical
nature of government spending. Because of the
fiscal institutions that exist in many states (such as
balanced budget rules and borrowing restrictions),
policymakers’ options for mitigating periods of
fiscal stress are effectively limited to the use of
reserve balances, spending reductions, and tax
increases.
In this paper we follow Wagner and Elder
(2006) and use a Markov-switching regression
model to empirically describe the expansions and
contractions in states of the Eighth Federal Reserve
District.1 Using the estimated parameters, we form
probability distributions of the revenue shortfalls
states are likely to encounter during the next down-
turn. Based on fiscal-year-end projections for 2007,
Economic downturns often force state policymakers to enact sizable tax increases or spending cuts
to close budget shortfalls. In this paper the authors make use of a Markov-switching regression
model to empirically describe the expansions and contractions in the states of the Eighth Federal
Reserve District. They use the estimated parameters from the switching regressions to form prob-
ability distributions of the revenue shortfalls states are likely to encounter in future slowdowns.
This allows them to estimate the probability that each state’s projected fiscal-year-end balances
will be sufficient to offset the fiscal stress from a recession. (JEL E6, H7)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Regional Economic Development, 2007, 3(2), pp. 75-87.
1 The Eighth District states are Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee.
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1997; Crain, 2003). Most state tax bases, including
the primary bases of retail sales and wage and
salary income, tend to be strongly procyclical.
This means that revenue growth from these sources
expands more rapidly than a state’s economy dur-
ing expansions and contracts more severely during
downturns. Given the difficulty of forecasting
recessions, state policymakers often find them-
selves in situations in which revenue is insufficient
to match expenditure demands.
Policymakers normally rely on spending reduc-
tions, tax increases, and reserve balances accumu-
lated during periods of revenue growth (or savings)
to help mitigate unexpected budget shortfalls.
Although the use of savings has expanded in recent
decades, with nearly all states having a formal
“rainy day” or budget stabilization fund to institu-
tionalize the process, spending reductions and
tax increases constitute the majority of state fiscal
adjustments made during recessions. Following the
2001 national recession, for instance, the National
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO)
reported that states increased taxes by nearly $18
billion during fiscal years 2002 though 2004 and
also reduced budgeted spending by nearly $30 bil-
lion over the same period.2 Moreover, states used
more than $9 billion in reserve balances during
this period to help close budget gaps, which is
considerably more than the $1 billion in savings
tapped during the 1990-91 downturn (Holcombe
and Sobel, 1997).
States in the Eighth Federal Reserve District
were not immune to the difficult times associated
with the 2001 recession. Table 1 reports the tax
and spending adjustments for each state in the
Eighth District for fiscal years 2002 through 2004.
Eighth District states increased taxes by nearly
$3.3 billion from 2002 through 2004, with all of the
increases occurring in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
Three states—Illinois, Indiana, and Tennessee—
accounted for more than 95 percent of the tax
increases in the District. Arkansas, Kentucky, and
Missouri made modest tax adjustments, while
Mississippi was the only state in the District to
avoid tax increases during the slowdown.
On the expenditure side, Illinois, Indiana, and
Missouri were responsible for more than 80 percent
of the District’s after-budget adjustments. Most of
these spending cuts occurred in 2002 and 2003,
with only Illinois and Indiana making changes in
2004. Tennessee had the smallest expenditure
adjustments during the recession, with $64 million
in cuts in 2003.
Across the nation, states relied more heavily
on spending adjustments than tax increases
(roughly 60-40) during the 2001 downturn. In the
Eighth District, however, only Arkansas, Illinois,
and Indiana had a mix of tax increases and spend-
ing reductions that approximated the adjustments
in the rest of the country. Kentucky, Mississippi,
and Missouri relied almost exclusively on spend-
ing cuts, whereas Tennessee relied almost entirely
on tax increases.
“Optimal” Rainy Day Funds
To assess how “prepared” states may be in
future recessions, it is necessary to quantify the
fiscal stress that states are likely to experience dur-
ing a downturn. Previous studies have addressed
this issue from the point of view of an “optimal”
rainy day fund: If a state typically experiences fis-
cal stress equal to, say, 12 percent of the budget
during a downturn, then savings equal to this
amount would be sufficient to eliminate the need
for spending cuts and tax increases throughout
the slowdown.3
Early attempts to estimate the fiscal stress that
states experience, such as Pollock and Suyderhoud
(1986), Sobel and Holcombe (1996), and Navin
and Navin (1997), did so by examining the cumu-
lative deviation in the series of interest (either
revenues or revenues plus expenditures) from a
Wagner and Elder
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2 Given that the spending figures reported by NASBO do not account
for spending reductions that occurred at the time state budgets were
initially adopted, the aggregate reduction in state spending due to
the recession is potentially much larger than $30 billion. For a more
detailed analysis of the 2001 recession on state fiscal health, see
Garrett and Wagner (2004).
3 The use of savings to insure against unexpected budget shortfalls
has several advantages over the use of spending cuts and tax
increases. First, expenditure reductions and tax increases are unpop-
ular among voters and therefore may be politically costly for policy-
makers. Second, the use of savings is an expansionary policy, whereas
expenditure reductions and tax increases are contractionary policies.
See Wagner and Elder (2005) for an overview on the effectiveness of
state rainy day funds and reserve balances.linear trend. For example, Sobel and Holcombe
(1996) summed the cumulative shortfalls in expen-
ditures and revenues from their respective trends
from 1989 to 1992 and found that the average state
would have needed reserves equal to 30 percent of
expenditures to maintain trend expenditures and
revenues during the 1990-91 recession. Examining
individual states over a longer period, Pollock and
Suyderhoud (1986) and Navin and Navin (1997)
find that savings equal to 11 percent and 13 percent
of the budgets in Indiana and Ohio, respectively,
would be sufficient to offset a normal downturn.
Although Pollock and Suyderhoud (1986),
Sobel and Holcombe (1996), and Navin and Navin
(1997) provide only point estimates of state fiscal
stress, it is possible to form probability distribu-
tions of state expansions and contractions using a
linear-trend approach. This would allow one not
only to estimate a distribution of shortfalls that
states are likely to experience, conditional on past
recessions, but also to calculate how much states
would need to save during expansions to insure
against those possible shortfalls that a state may
experience. However, using a linear-trend approach
to form these distributions has a serious shortcom-
ing because the parameters from a linear-trend
model are chosen to minimize the deviation from
trend rather than to best describe the distribution
of expansions and contractions in the data. In other
words, if expansions are defined as periods above
Wagner and Elder
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Table 1
Fiscal Adjustments of Eighth District States Due to 2001 Recession (in millions of current dollars)
2002 2003 2004 Total
Tax adjustments
Arkansas –2.3 0 109.3 107
Illinois 0 370 828 1,198
Indiana –5.9 1,002 2 998.1
Kentucky 0088
Mississippi 0000
Missouri –24.5 72.5 0 48
Tennessee 0 933.2 0 933.2
Eighth District total –32.7 2,377.7 947.3 3,292.3
Total all states 303.8 8,018 9,550 17,871.8
Spending adjustments (made after budget enactment)
Arkansas 171 73 0 244
Illinois 500 202 1,320 2,022
Indiana 468.7 345.7 60 874.4
Kentucky 231.5 90.1 0 321.6
Mississippi 150.6 47.8 0 198.4
Missouri 750 304.7 0 1,054.7
Tennessee 0 64 0 64
Eighth District total 2,271.8 11,27.3 1,380 4,779.1
Total all states 13,668 11,752 3,488 28,908
SOURCE: Various issues of Fiscal Survey of the States, National Association of State Budget Officers.trend and contractions are defined as periods below
trend, then there is no reason to believe that the
expansions and contractions identified from a
linear-trend model will correspond to actual busi-
ness cycles.4
A recent paper by Wagner and Elder (2006)
attempts to overcome this limitation by identifying
state economic cycles using a Markov-switching
regression model. The model explicitly assumes
that a data series can be characterized by a series
of distinct regimes (such as expansions and con-
tractions), and recent work by Li, Lin, and Hsiu-hua
(2005) suggests that the model performs very well
in accurately identifying business cycle turning
points. Estimation involves jointly determining
the parameter values describing each regime that
best fit the observed data. These parameters include
an estimate of the mean growth rate of each regime,
as well as the probabilities that a given observation
came from either an expansion or contraction
regime, which are known as transition probabilities.
Wagner and Elder (2006) demonstrate how the
estimated parameters from a Markov-switching
regression model may be used to construct empiri-
cal probability distributions of state expansions
and contractions. Forming these distributions for
each state, Wagner and Elder (2006) find that the
typical state’s expected revenue shortfall is between
2.9 and 3.5 percent of revenue when the shortfall
is measured relative to zero revenue growth, and
between 13 and 16 percent of revenue when the
shortfall is measured relative to the average rate of
revenue growth during expansions. In addition,
forming distributions of complete cycles that are
based on the uncertainty in expansions and con-
tractions, Wagner and Elder find that the average
state should save between 0.5 and 2.5 percent of
revenue during each expansion period to accumu-
late reserve balances sufficient to weather the next
downturn without the need for tax increases or
spending cuts.
MARKOV-SWITCHING MODEL
AND EIGHTH DISTRICT STATE
BUSINESS CYCLES
Markov-Switching Model
The basic idea underlying regime-switching
models is that many data series appear to be gen-
erated from multiple, distinct data-generating
processes. As Hamilton (1994) notes, structural
breaks or regime changes in a data series may be
triggered by a variety of factors, including economic
downturns, policy changes, and financial crises.
If the regime changes are assumed to be predict-
able and known a priori, then they may simply be
modeled using dummy variables. A more practical
assumption is that the occurrence of such regime
changes is unknown.
Econometric models featuring regime changes
were first studied by Quandt (1958). Goldfeld and
Quandt (1973) extended Quandt’s simple switching
model by allowing the data series to be generated
by multiple regime switches that were governed by
a Markov process so that the timing of the switches
became dependent on the current regime in effect.
Although regime-switching regressions have a
long history, they were not widely employed as a
means of modeling business cycle movements until
Hamilton (1989) extended Goldfeld and Quandt’s
model to include serially dependent data.
Hamilton’s model was a two-regime autoregression
applied to the growth rate in real U.S. gross national
product under the assumption that the regimes
exogenously switched according to an unobserved
Markov process. He found that not only did the
model best fit the data when it identified distinct
expansion and contraction regimes, but also that
the changes between regimes closely matched the
NBER recession turning points.
Although Markov-switching models have been
widely used to examine aggregate data, they have
only recently been applied to U.S. states. Owyang,
Piger, and Wall (2005a) were the first to make use
of the model and explored the extent to which
state-level business cycles track the aggregate econ-
omy. Using Crone’s (2002) monthly coincident
index of state-level labor-market activity, they find
Wagner and Elder
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4 A related paper by Cornia and Nelson (2003) uses value-at-risk (VaR)
to model the maximum budget shortfall that a state can expect to
experience over a fixed time period. However, because VaR cannot
model a data series as being generated by two (or more) probability
distributions, such as expansions and contractions, it is impossible
to form distributions of savings rates using VaR.that, while state cycles generally follow the aggre-
gate economy, individual states may shift into an
expansion or contraction before the national econ-
omy shifts, continue in an expansion as the national
economy contracts, and experience a downturn
that is not associated with an aggregate downturn.
Moreover, Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005a) find
that expansion growth rates depend positively on
the state’s education and age composition, whereas
recession growth rates depend on the state’s indus-
try mix.
Because state revenue data are published only
annually and also include discretionary changes to
both tax rates and tax bases, they are poorly suited
for isolating state-level business cycle movements.
As a result, we follow both Owyang, Piger, and
Wall (2005a) and Wagner and Elder (2006) by using
Crone’s (2002) monthly coincident index as our
measure of state-level economic activity over the
period 1979:09–2007:01. As Owyang, Piger, and
Wall (2005a) note, an advantage of Crone’s (2002)
index is that, unlike many state-level data series,
it exhibits distinct business cycle movements at a
high frequency. On the other hand, because the
index is constructed from only labor market vari-
ables, it is not as broad a measure of economic
activity as gross domestic or gross state product.
Denoting a state’s monthly growth rate in the
coincident index at time t as y .
t, the two-regime
Markov-switching model may be expressed as
(1)
where ﾵ denotes the mean growth rate and ʵt is the
error term at time t assumed to be normally dis-
tributed with variance ˃ 2
ʵ. The growth rate in (1)
is assumed to switch exogenously between two
regimes, and the switches are governed by an unob-
served regime variable, St = {0,1}. When St = 0,
which we refer to as the low-growth regime, y .
t
follows a stationary AR(0) process and is assumed
to be generated by a normal distribution with a
mean of ﾵ0. When St switches from 0 to 1, which
we call the high-growth regime, y .























have been generated from a normal distribution
with a mean equal to ﾵ0 + ﾵ1. In short, the data-
generating process for y .
t is a mixture of two normal
distributions having the same variance but poten-
tially different means.
Although St is unobserved, its behavior is
restricted to evolve according to a first-order, two-
state Markov chain with the following transition
matrix:
(2)
where Pij is the transition probability of St = i,
given that St–1 = j. Hence, PHH is the probability
that economic activity is in the high-growth regime
in period t, conditional on having been in the high-
growth regime in period t–1. Placing restrictions
on the behavior of St allows one to estimate the
probability that economic activity is in an expan-
sion (or contraction) regime in each time period,
despite the fact that the underlying regime is
assumed to be latent and unobservable.5
Markov-Switching Parameter Estimates
for Eighth District States
The parameter estimates from each Eighth
District state’s Markov-switching regression are
presented in Table 2. The expected duration of
each regime, which is discussed in more detail
below, is also presented.
Given that we are updating the specification
used by Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005a) and
Wagner and Elder (2006) with more available data,
P =
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5 We also follow Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005a) and estimate the
models using the Bayesian Gibbs-sampling approach developed by
Kim and Nelson (1998). Our prior distributions were set equal to the
priors of Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005a), and the joint posterior
distributions were simulated using 10,000 replications with an addi-
tional 2,000 burn-in replications. The mean parameters (ﾵ0 and ﾵ1)
are assumed to be normally distributed with means of 1 and –1,
respectively, and a covariance matrix that is equal to the identity
matrix. The transition probabilities, PHH and PLL, have prior beta
distributions given by ʲ(9,1) and ʲ(8,2), implying means of 0.9 and
0.8, respectively. For a more detailed description of the estimation
procedure, see Kim and Nelson (1998) and Owyang, Piger, and Wall
(2005a). We acknowledge use of the computer routines described in
Kim and Nelson (1999).our parameter estimates are very similar to the
parameter estimates of these studies. The median
expansion and contraction (monthly) growth
rates across the Eighth District states are 0.351
and –0.194, respectively. However, as shown in
the first column of Table 2, expansion growth
rates range from a high of 0.389 in Tennessee to a
low of 0.334 in Arkansas; recession growth rates,
shown in column 2, vary from a low of –0.386 in
Indiana to a high of –0.057 in Tennessee. There is
considerably more variation in the average reces-
sion growth rates across the District than in the
average expansion growth rates. In fact, three states
in the District, Arkansas, Mississippi, and
Tennessee, have average recession growth rates
less than –0.10, whereas three states have recession
growth rates in excess (more negative) of –0.20.6
The estimated transition probabilities for each
state, PHH and PLL, demonstrate the persistence in
each regime. Given an expansion in period t–1,
our estimates indicate that the median state in the
District has a 0.980 probability of expanding in
period t. Similarly, the probability is 0.937 that a
contraction in period t–1 will be followed by a
contraction in period t. As Hamilton (1994) shows,
the expected duration of regime j may be computed
as E[tj] = ￿1 – Pjj￿
–1 for j = H,L. (These figures are
reported for each state in Table 2.) Although cycle
durations vary noticeably, the median Eighth
District state can expect to experience 50 months
of expansion (denoted E[tH] in Table 2), followed
by nearly 16 months of contraction (denoted E[tL]
in Table 2), resulting in an expected business cycle
of 66 months. The state with the longest expected
expansion in the District, Arkansas, will on average
experience continuous growth for one year longer
than the state with the shortest expected expansion,
Mississippi. Similarly, Illinois has the longest
expected contraction in the District, at just over 20
months, which is 9 months longer than Indiana’s
shortest expected contraction.7 Overall, the Markov-
switching model identifies nearly 77 percent of
the observations as expansions, suggesting that
the normal regime for all states in the District is
one of growth.
Wagner and Elder
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Table 2
Markov-Switching Parameter Estimates
ﾵ ˆ0 + ﾵ ˆ1 ﾵ ˆ0 P ˆ
HH P ˆ
LL E[tH] E[tL] E[tH] + E[tL]
Arkansas 0.334* –0.082* 0.982 0.940 55.55 16.71 72.27
Illinois 0.362* –0.239* 0.978 0.950 45.72 20.08 65.80
Indiana 0.337* –0.386* 0.981 0.910 54.90 11.22 66.12
Kentucky 0.350* –0.194* 0.980 0.936 51.82 15.72 67.54
Mississippi 0.341* –0.075 0.975 0.930 41.19 14.45 55.65
Missouri 0.362* –0.216* 0.980 0.941 50.48 17.12 67.61
Tennessee 0.389* –0.057 0.979 0.936 49.40 15.79 65.20
Median 0.351 –0.194 0.980 0.937 50.48 15.79 66.28
NOTE: The reported parameters are the means of the posterior distributions; *denotes that the 90 percent highest posterior density
interval does not contain zero; and E[tH] and E[tL] denote the expected duration of expansions and contractions, respectively.
6 See Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005b) for a much more detailed
analysis of the expansion growth rates, contraction growth rates,
and regime turning points in Eighth District states.
7 Although we do not report the estimated probability that a state is
in an expansion at a given point in time (St), it is generally very clear
whether a state is currently in an expansion or contraction regime.
Owyang , Piger, and Wall (2005b) examine these probabilities in
detail for Eighth District states, and the interested reader is referred
to their paper.EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF
STATE SHORTFALLS AND SAVINGS
RULES
Probability Distributions of State
Revenue Shortfalls
The estimated parameters of the Markov-
switching regressions provide measures of the
duration and amplitude of state economic cycles.
In this section of the paper we follow Wagner and
Elder (2006) and use these parameters to form
probability distributions of state revenue shortfalls.
Although states may experience fiscal pressure
on both the expenditure and revenue sides of the
budget, Kusko and Rubin (1993) note that revenue
streams are far more sensitive to business cycle
movements than expenditures. We therefore focus
only on state revenue, implying that our estimates
should be interpreted as the minimum fiscal
stress that states are likely to experience during a
downturn.
In addition, given that state tax bases tend to be
more volatile than economic activity, we define ˕
as the elasticity of a state’s total revenue growth with
respect to the growth in the state’s economy. Each
state’s high- and low-regime growth rates in rev-
enue may therefore be expressed as gH = ˕￿ﾵ ˆ0 + ﾵ ˆ1￿
and gL = ˕ﾵ ˆ0, respectively. The use of an elasticity
allows us to alter the degree of revenue variability
that is due to a state’s particular tax mix. In short,
we assume that changes in state-level revenue
growth mimic changes in the state’s economic
activity (i.e., revenue growth has the same transi-
tion probabilities as overall economic activity), but
permit revenue to be more volatile than overall
economic activity. To explore the sensitivity of
our estimates, we use three reasonable revenue
elasticities (1.2, 1.5, and 1.8) for each state.
Given that PLL is the probability that a contrac-
tion in period t–1 will be followed by a contraction
in period t, the probability that a downturn will
persist exactly tL periods is given by
Therefore, if one computes (i) each state’s revenue
shortfall for a contraction lasting tL = 1, 2,…, ￿
periods and (ii) the probability that a recession of
Pt P P LL L L
t
LL
t LL ( ) =−
−1 .
exactly that length will occur, the values may then
be used to form a cumulative probability distribu-
tion. The distributions may then be used to deter-
mine how much states need to save to achieve a
given level of certainty. In addition, for a given
level of savings, the distributions can also be used
to estimate the probability that this level of savings
will be sufficient in a future downturn.
To calculate the shortfalls, we set revenue
growth at a monthly rate of gH during each expan-
sion period and at a rate of gL during each contrac-
tion period. Shortfalls are measured relative to an
amplitude parameter, ʳ, that is nothing more than
the target monthly growth rate in revenue during
each recession period. Although ʳ may take on
any value, we calculate shortfalls using both ʳ = 0
and ʳ = gH. Setting ʳ = gH measures the shortfall
relative to the average expansion growth rate in
revenue, whereas setting ʳ = 0 measures the short-
fall relative to zero revenue growth. In other words,
ʳ = gH will generate the level of savings required
to maintain the average expansion growth rate in
revenue throughout a downturn, while ʳ = 0 yields
the level of savings needed to sustain a constant
level of revenue (or zero growth rate) throughout a
slowdown.
If an expansion lasts tH periods, then the state’s
level of revenue will be equal to R0￿1 + gH￿tH, where
gH is the (per-period) expansion growth rate in
revenue and R0 is the initial level of revenue.
Assuming a contraction begins and the (per-period)
growth rate in revenue switches to gL, the level of
revenue will then be equal to R0￿1 + gH￿tH ￿1 + gL￿
after the first low-growth period and the total rev-
enue shortfall will be equal to R0￿1 + gH￿tH [￿1 + ʳ ￿
– ￿1 + gL￿]. Relative to revenue in the previous
expansion period, which effectively measures the
shortfall as a percentage of revenue, the shortfall
may be written as ￿1 + ʳ ￿ – ￿1 + gL￿. Hence, for a
recession lasting tL periods, the total revenue short-
fall expressed as a share of revenue will be
(3)
For each state in the Eighth District, we assume
that a recession may persist for a maximum of 30
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stant-revenue shortfall” and “expansion-revenue
shortfall,” respectively. Figure 1 illustrates sample
cumulative density functions for both shortfalls
using the median parameter estimates in Table 2
and a revenue elasticity of 1.2.
The expected value of the constant-revenue
shortfall is 4.72 percent of revenue, whereas the
mean of the expansion-revenue shortfall is 14.15
percent. The expected shortfall values are reported
for each District state in Table 3 using revenue
elasticities of 1.2, 1.5, and 1.8.8
Depending on the revenue elasticity, the
median state in the Eighth District can expect to
encounter a constant-revenue shortfall of between
4.6 and 6.8 percent of revenue during a given
recession. Because the magnitude of a constant-
revenue shortfall is a function of both the state’s
average recession growth and the expected dura-
tion of a recession, the expected constant-revenue
shortfall in Illinois is much larger than the shortfall
for any other state in the Eighth District. In contrast,
the moderate recession growth rates in Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Tennessee imply that these states
could maintain a constant level of revenue during
a typical downturn with reserve balances of
approximately 3 percent of the budget.
The expansion-revenue shortfall estimates,
which depend on the duration of a recession plus
the difference between the average expansion and
average recession growth rates, are noticeably larger
than this 3 percent for every state in the District.
In fact, the expansion-revenue shortfalls exceed
10 percent of the state’s revenue for every elasticity
value in five of the District’s seven states and exceed
this threshold in all seven states if the elasticity is
1.5 or larger. With an elasticity of 1.5, for example,
the typical state in the Eighth District can expect a
budget shortfall between 15 and 17 percent of rev-
enue during a “normal” downturn, but the esti-
mates range from a high of nearly 32 percent in
Illinois to a low of just over 11 percent in Indiana
and Mississippi.
Although the expansion-revenue shortfall
estimates are quite large, it is important to recall
Wagner and Elder
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Figure 1
Cumulative Density Functions of Revenue Shortfalls
(Elasticity = 1.2, gH = 0.351, gL = –0.194, PHH = 0.980, and PLL = 0.937)
8 The shortfall distributions were constructed by varying the number
of periods (length of recessions) and restricting revenue to grow at
its estimated average rate each period, gL. Wagner and Elder (2006)
explored an alternative approach by varying both the length of
recessions and per-period growth rate in revenue. They find that
both approaches produced similar results.Wagner and Elder
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 2007 83
Table 3
Expected Revenue Shortfalls for Eighth District States (percentage of revenue)
Constant-revenue shortfall (ʳ = 0) Expansion-revenue shortfall (ʳ = gH)
Revenue elasticity Revenue elasticity
1.2 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.8
Arkansas 2.26 2.81 3.36 12.24 15.50 18.86
Illinois 9.14 11.28 13.37 25.09 31.68 38.43
Indiana 4.64 5.74 6.81 9.07 11.33 13.60
Kentucky 4.64 5.75 6.84 13.89 17.51 21.19
Mississippi 1.56 1.95 2.33 9.12 11.54 14.02
Missouri 6.08 7.52 8.94 17.50 22.08 26.76
Tennessee 1.43 1.78 2.13 11.86 15.07 18.38
Mean 4.25 5.26 6.25 14.11 17.82 21.61
Median 4.64 5.74 6.81 12.24 15.50 18.86
Maximum 9.14 11.28 13.37 25.09 31.68 38.43
Minimum 1.43 1.78 2.13 9.07 11.33 13.60
Table 4
Projected Fiscal Standing of Eighth District States
Probability FY 2007 balance is sufficient
Projected FY 2007-end balance
(share of revenue) Constant-revenue shortfall Expansion-revenue shortfall
Arkansas 5.33 0.853 0.552
Illinois 3.34 0.512 0.336
Indiana 6.10 0.756 0.645
Kentucky 7.85 0.808 0.603
Mississippi 4.62 0.894 0.581
Missouri 8.55 0.767 0.573
Tennessee 4.77 0.958 0.652
Mean 5.79 0.793 0.563
Median 5.33 0.808 0.581
Maximum 8.55 0.958 0.652
Minimum 3.34 0.512 0.336
NOTE: FY is fiscal year. Projected FY 2007 balances were obtained from individual state budgets.that measuring shortfalls relative to expansions
provides a useful upper bound for analyzing state
fiscal stress. If policymakers were to save according
to their state’s expansion-revenue shortfalls, then,
on average, the state would be able to avoid all
expenditure reductions and tax increases for the
duration of a slowdown.
An alternative perspective is to use each state’s
shortfall distributions to determine the probability
that the state’s current level of savings is sufficient
to offset a given shortfall. We do this for each state
using the state’s fiscal-year-end projections for
2007. The results are provided below in Table 4.
We looked at Eighth District states’ fiscal year
2007 projections and found that the average state
will have reserve balances in excess of 5 percent.
Moreover, the probability that any state’s savings
is sufficient to fully offset a downturn is, for the
most part, quite high. For example, our estimates
indicate that the probability is roughly 0.80 that
District states will be able to maintain a constant
level of revenue for the duration of a recession
without relying on tax increases or spending reduc-
tions. The estimates range from a high of over 95
percent in Tennessee to a low of just over 50 per-
cent in Illinois. In terms of hedging an expansion-
revenue shortfall, we find that there is nearly a 60
percent chance that District states will be able to
continue the average expansion growth rate in rev-
enue during a slowdown without the use of other
fiscal adjustments. In fact, all of the District states
except Illinois have at least a 55 percent chance of
escaping major fiscal adjustments relative to base-
line conditions should a slowdown begin in 2007.
Probability Distributions of State
Savings Rates
Because the parameters from the Markov-
switching regressions describe the distribution of
both expansions and contractions, Wagner and
Elder (2006) estimate savings rates that are based
on all of the possible expansion-contraction com-
binations that may occur in a given state. In this
section of the paper we show how these savings
rates are obtained, which essentially provide a
benchmark for policymakers interested in insuring
against fiscal shocks.
Assuming that policymakers save a fraction of
revenue (s) during each period of an expansion,
revenue will be equal to R0￿1 + gH￿ and savings
will be R0s ￿1 + gH￿ and at the end of one period.
Following tH periods of expansion, the state’s accu-
mulated savings, compounding at a rate r, will be
given by
(4)
If revenue growth switches from an expansion
to a contraction, then the revenue shortfall in the
first low-growth period will be the difference
between actual revenue, R0￿1 + gH￿tH ￿1 + gL￿, and
the target level of revenue, R0￿1 + gH￿tH ￿1 + ʳ￿￿1 – s￿,
where ʳ denotes the amplitude parameter specifying
the target revenue growth rate during contractions.
Prohibiting states from saving during contrac-
tion periods, the revenue shortfall in just the first
contraction period will be equal to
For a recession lasting tL periods, the state’s
cumulative revenue shortfall may be written as
(5)
Because equation (5) is the state’s revenue
shortfall from a downturn lasting tL periods and
equation (4) is the state’s savings from an expansion
lasting tH periods, setting equations (4) and (5)
equal to one another and solving for s yields the
faction of current revenue the state must save dur-
ing each of the tH expansion periods to accumulate
savings equal to the revenue shortfall. This savings
rate is given by
(6)
The savings rate given by equation (6) applies
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expansions (tH) and the length of recessions (tL)
are independent, then the probability that an
expansion persisting tH periods will be followed
by a recession lasting tL periods can be computed
as PH￿tH￿ ￗ PL￿tL￿, where
Assuming that both expansions and recessions
last for a maximum of 30 years (or 360 months),
we form savings rate distributions from the
129,600 possible expansion-contraction combina-
tions. The expected savings rate for constant-
revenue shortfalls (ʳ = 0) and expansion-revenue
shortfalls (ʳ = gH) are presented in Table 5 using
revenue elasticities of 1.2, 1.5, and 1.8.
The savings rates show the fraction of total
revenue that a state must save during each expan-
sion period in order to accumulate sufficient savings
to offset a “normal” fiscal cycle. Assuming a rev-
enue elasticity of 1.5 for instance, if the median
state in the Eighth District saved 1.08 percent of
revenue each expansion period, then the state
would be able to maintain a constant level of rev-
enue during a typical downturn and would have
Pt P P j H L jj j j
t
jj
t jj ( ) =− =
−1
for , .
zero reserve balances when the downturn ends. If
the objective is to maintain the average expansion
rate of revenue growth throughout a recession, then
the median state would need savings equal to 2.84
percent during each expansion period.9 For a given
target growth rate in revenue (ʳ), the closer policy-
makers are to achieving the state’s expected savings
rate, the more likely it is that the state will be able
to avoid expenditure reductions and tax increases
in the next recession.
CONCLUSION
Slowdowns in economic activity place tremen-
dous strain on state budgets and frequently force
policymakers to enact sizable spending cuts and
tax increases to close budget shortfalls. Following
Wagner and Elder (2006), this paper uses a basic
Markov-switching regression model to form empiri-
cal distributions of the monthly revenue cycles in
9 The Markov-switching model assumes that the underlying regime
is not observable. However, a reasonable approach to implementing
a savings rule in practice would be to rely on the estimated proba-
bility that a state is in an expansion at a given point in time, P￿St = 1￿.
The simplest possible rule for the state to follow would be to assume
that the economy is expanding (and therefore save) if P￿St = 1￿ > 0.5
and save nothing otherwise.
Wagner and Elder
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Table 5
Expected Savings Rates for Eighth District States (percentage of revenue)
Constant-revenue shortfall (ʳ = 0) Expansion-revenue shortfall (ʳ = gH)
Revenue elasticity Revenue elasticity
1.2 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.8
Arkansas 0.39 0.49 0.59 2.12 2.71 3.33
Illinois 1.52 1.89 2.27 4.28 5.51 6.80
Indiana 1.03 1.29 1.55 2.08 2.65 3.23
Kentucky 0.86 1.08 1.30 2.61 3.35 4.11
Mississippi 0.33 0.41 0.50 1.92 2.45 3.00
Missouri 1.08 1.35 1.63 3.17 4.07 5.01
Tennessee 0.27 0.34 0.41 2.22 2.84 3.49
Mean 0.78 0.98 1.18 2.63 3.37 4.14
Median 0.86 1.08 1.30 2.22 2.84 3.49
Maximum 1.52 1.89 2.27 4.28 5.51 6.80
Minimum 0.27 0.34 0.41 1.92 2.45 3.00Eighth District states. We then estimate the revenue
shortfalls that District states are likely to experience
in a future recession using multiple fiscal objectives.
We find, for instance, that the typical state in
the District needs reserve balances equal to 4 to 6
percent of revenue to maintain a constant level of
revenue during the next recession without relying
on spending cuts and tax increases. If the goal is
to preserve the average expansion growth rate in
revenue during a slowdown, while simultaneously
avoiding spending or tax adjustments, then the
average state would need to have savings equal to
15 to 17 percent of revenue before the start of the
next recession. Based on fiscal-year-end projections
for 2007, we find that all of the Eighth District states
except Illinois have a greater than 50 percent
chance of avoiding major fiscal adjustments should
a slowdown begin in 2007.
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